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European climate and energy policies are under stress. The Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) of the EU suffers from a severe over-allocation of emission 
permits, leading to a very low CO
2
 price. In almost all European countries, 
wholesale electricity prices are declining and are already too low to trigger 
investments in new generation and network assets. Such investments are essential 
to prepare for the coming transition towards a more sustainable global energy 
system.41  Estimates of conventional generation reserve margins between now 
and 2020 suggest low electricity prices and a problematic investment climate 
for the next years. As the energy transition is a gigantic investment project, 
the current disincentives to invest are likely to significantly delay the pace of 
decarbonisation efforts in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the production of coal and its use for electricity generation is 
increasing in Europe. In 2011, the consumption of coal in the EU increased by 
3.6%, while demand fell by 1.1% in all other countries of the OECD (Rühl and 
Giljum, 2012). In the UK, the share of coal in electricity generation increased 
from 30% in 2011 to 42.8% in 2012, leading to an increase in coal consumption 
of 32.5% in 2012 (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013). Similar 
evolutions in Germany and Spain conflict with decarbonisation scenarios for 
Europe. 
In the period between 2000 and 2010, greenhouse gas emissions dropped by 
5.7% in the US, but by only 4.4% in the EU-27 (EC-JRC, 2012). As the very 
complex European climate and energy policy architecture is outperformed by 
a country without explicit climate policy targets – but with a higher economic 
growth rate – how sustainable is the perception that the EU holds the leadership 
in international climate policy? 
41 Fossil fuels have a role to play in all transition scenarios up to 2050.
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The goal of this chapter is to explain and assess some of the problematic 
interactions in European climate and energy policies. Is the complex European 
approach contributing to the problem it was designed to cure? Do we risk delaying 
the European component of the energy transition? How problematic might such 
a delay be? Based on a transition perspective, I conclude by discussing some 
options to improve the effectiveness of policy frameworks in the next decade. 
overallocation in the emissions trading system and ‘20/20/20’
Too soft a cornerstone 
IHS CERA (2011) estimates that the overallocation of emission permits under 
the ETS is equivalent to 1.4 billion tonnes of CO
2
 in the period between 2013 
and 2020. The steep economic downturn since 2008, combined with the current 
double-dip outlook, is partly responsible for this overallocation. Although Phase 
III of the ETS (2013–20) introduced auctioning for the energy sector, CO
2
 prices 
under the ETS fell further in the first half of 2013 (to €5). Figure 3.1 shows the 
evolution of the CO
2
 price under the ETS between 2005 and 2012. 
Figure 3.1 The ETS CO
2
 price between 2005 and 2012
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The contrast with projections of the ETS price made in 2007 is large. As a 
consequence, the ETS sectors – responsible for close to 45% of total European 
CO
2
 emissions (EC-JRC 2012) – currently do not have a market incentive to 
invest in ambitious carbon-mitigation measures. Without a significant carbon 
penalty, the relative fossil fuel prices of today ensure that old CO
2
-intensive coal-
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powered electricity plants in Europe can easily compete with gas-powered plants 
that are much more carbon efficient but face a higher fuel cost per MWh of 
electricity produced. As the EU unfailingly presents the ETS as “the cornerstone 
of its drive to reduce emissions of man-made greenhouse gases” (EC-JRC, 
2012), the current situation is far from optimal. 
Interactions among climate policy goals and the ETS 
Climate and energy policy options determine technological choices for the 
production of energy services as well as for the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. An economy-wide carbon tax will result in other technological 
choices than binding targets for renewable energy sources (RES). The European 
‘20/20/20’ approach of 2007 sets an overall emissions reduction target of 20% 
(the first ‘20’ of 20/20/20) but also imposes very direct technological choices 
by 2020 (European Commission, 2007). Economic agents are required to invest 
in RES and in energy efficiency projects, irrespective of the availability of low-
cost sources and technologies. By its nature, the 20% reduction target suggests 
that economic agents are free to decide how to meet the mitigation target. But 
emissions trading or carbon pricing is limited to those emissions not yet reduced 
by RES and efficiency policies. 
Important decisions on the future allocation of CO
2 
emission permits up to 
2020 under Phase III of the ETS were also taken in 2007. The time horizon of 
the 20/20/20 package and of Phase III of the ETS is often presented as offering a 
long-term perspective to investors. However, the lifetime of energy system assets 
is typically in the range of 25 to 50 years. From this perspective, targets through 
2020 mainly affect short-term investment decisions.
Twenty per cent or 30 per cent?
The EU initially wanted to commit to a 30% reduction target by 2020 upon the 
condition that other leading economies, such as the US, would commit to similar 
efforts. This easy switch of emission reduction targets reveals that the 20% target 
is a soft one because of the ongoing deindustrialisation of Europe. With less 
energy-intensive activities in Europe and more imports of manufactured goods 
from outside the EU, it is rather easy to lower the domestic production of CO
2
 
emissions (Helm, 2012). From a strategic perspective, Europe risks losing 
credibility by choosing domestic reduction targets as a bargaining chip. 
Why supplemental policies?
The 20/20/20 package contains two additional policies to support carbon pricing 
as the core policy instrument to trigger a least-cost market response to the 
challenge of climate change. Because of multiple market barriers and failures 
(imperfections), carbon pricing alone will not fully unlock the existing potential 
for energy efficiency. Without technology-support policies, no radically 
new low-carbon technologies will hit the market in the coming decades. The 
availability of cost-effective energy-efficiency opportunities offers the potential 
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to meet a given emission-reduction goal at a low carbon price. Without the 
emission reduction from energy efficiency investments, other sectors – such as 
industries exposed to international competition – need to take additional and 
more expensive mitigation measures (IEA, 2011). 
Unfortunately, the use of supplementary policies adds additional uncertainty 
to the ETS market. The companies participating in the ETS base their strategic 
behaviour on price expectations. If supplementary policies such as RES and 
efficiency targets over- or under-deliver on their expected level of emissions 
reductions, the needed abatement within the ETS and, hence, the ETS price will 
be affected. These additional fluctuations in the CO
2
 price can delay investment 
decisions. 
Recent policy experiences show, furthermore, that the cost of supplementary 
policies can be higher than expected. Deployment targets for RES threaten to 
bring  (too) expensive technologies into the market because of the historical 
under-investment in energy research, development, and demonstration (RD&D). 
Premature support for immature technologies should be avoided (Kramer and 
Haigh, 2009). It is not a coincidence that EU countries with very generous 
support schemes for photovoltaics today face a real explosion of retail electricity 
costs (see CEER, 2013). This could have been avoided by scaling up past public 
RD&D efforts in order to set more ambitious deployment targets at a lower 
cost to society. As the high cost of deploying RES is partly channelled to ETS 
companies through higher electricity network costs, this supplementary measure 
risks undermining the competitiveness of energy-intensive ETS companies on 
international markets. 
Finally, measures to accelerate the potential for energy efficiency often are not 
justified from a market failure perspective. Many energy efficiency opportunities 
are neglected because of high discount rates, differences in preferences, or 
limited access to capital. These are not market failures – everyone would like to 
have more capital – and hence do not justify the use of expensive fiscal subsidies 
that primarily benefit those economic agents with higher and middle incomes. 
These fiscal subsidies do not have a direct impact on the electricity price but they 
do have an opportunity cost (for example, by crowding out resources available 
for public R&D). Policy interventions should focus on traditional market 
failures such as principal-agent relationships, split incentives (landlord-tenant), 
and adverse selection. Such market failures can partly be addressed with smart 
regulation at a lower cost. 
Policy interactions and impact on the ETS price
Because of the economic crisis, electricity demand in many European countries 
was lower in 2012 than in 2007. Overcapacity in conventional generation 
increased during that period, and wholesale electricity prices in northwestern 
Europe fell from €75 in 2007 to less than €50 in 2012. More than five years after 
the start of the crisis, Europe is entering a new – or perhaps just another – crisis 
in the steel industry, with job losses and plant closures. Energy demand can be 
further reduced, leading to an even greater over-allocation of permits in the ETS. 
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But the efficiency of the ETS is also affected by the 20% RES target and the 20% 
energy efficiency target. 
The obligation to invest in RES serves to reduce emissions, especially from 
gas-powered plants in markets with stagnating demand. As a consequence, CO
2
 
emissions in the electricity sector – a major sector in the ETS – are in principle 
lower than in scenarios without high RES obligations. Because the electricity 
sector has to execute a technological mandate, the 20% RES mandate affects the 
remaining demand for emission permits. Simultaneously, all economic sectors 
– including the ETS sectors – are required to improve their energy efficiency 
performance between now and 2020. Higher energy efficiency levels lead to 
lower consumption of fossil energy and lower CO
2
 emissions. 
IHS CERA (2011) and Roques (2012) estimated the impact of both targets on 
CO
2 
emissions – 20% RES and 20% energy efficiency – to conclude that their 
potential impact on emissions from ETS companies is large enough that the cap 
of the ETS Phase III can be met without any further mitigation effort. Figure 
3.2 shows that subtracting the CO
2
 reductions from both 20% targets by 2020 
leads to emissions very close to the ETS Phase III cap. From this perspective, the 
20/20/20 package seems to be a deliberate effort by policymakers to make the 
ETS redundant. After 2013, projected emissions exceed the ETS cap in Figure 
3.2. However, the 2007 projection of baseline emissions for the period 2007–20 in 
the figure dates from the pre-crisis era. Since 2008, emissions of ETS companies 
followed a bumpy road. In 2009 alone, there was a reduction of 200 million 
tonnes of CO
2
 (Roques, 2012). So while the economic crisis has had a profound 
impact on over-allocation in the ETS, even without the crisis the cap would be a 
soft one. With the crisis, the cap has no relevance whatsoever. Even with a 30% 
reduction target for the EU, this would likely be so – an embarrassment for the 
‘backbone of European climate policy’.
The assessment by IHS CERA (2011) shows that energy efficiency measures, 
in particular, can lead to very strong emission reductions, even in a few years. 
This may be an overly optimistic presentation of the emission-reduction potential 
of energy efficiency measures in the short run. Nevertheless, the conclusions of 
this quantitative assessment are largely confirmed in other assessments. The IEA 
(2012) also argues that the strong growth of renewable energy, driven by policies 
outside the trading system, undermines the efficiency of he ETS. The IEA 
therefore concludes that ”policy considerations aimed at enhancing coherence 
between renewable policies and the ETS would be justified” (IEA, 2012, p. 569). 
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Figure 3.2 Interaction between ETS and the 20% RES and efficiency targets
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Although 20/20/20 is a soft package in terms of reduction ambitions, its design 
is not responsive to external factors such as the ongoing economic crisis or the 
rise of unconventional energy sources. The ETS faces the same rigidity – the cap 
cannot be adjusted to a new economic reality. The rigidity is problematic because 
of the use of short-term targets in 20/20/20 and in the ETS. With a longer time 
horizon – for example, 2030 or 2035 – unforeseen events would have a less 
dramatic impact on the relevance of policy goals because markets would have 
a better chance to adjust before the end of the longer commitment period. The 
alternatives of flexible reduction targets and flexible caps in the ETS by 2020 – 
for example, a cap inversely indexed to EU GDP – would severely complicate 
the ability to plan long-term energy technology investments. The alternative of 
a general carbon tax not connected to a specific short-term emission reduction 
target would avoid the current situation of economic incentives too low to trigger 
investments, but at the cost of creating another challenge: paying the carbon tax 
at times of severe economic crisis. 
electricity generation overcapacity
European electricity markets today face a significant generation overcapacity 
despite phase-out scenarios for old nuclear and coal capacity. In major economies, 
the reserve margin for conventional generation, or the available or remaining 
generation capacity at times of peak load, is in the range of 10% to 25%. 
E.ON AG (2011) projects a reserve margin of 15% between 2013 and 2020 for 
Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. For the Nordic region, the reserve 
Do European Climate and Energy Policies Threaten to Postpone  
the Energy Transition?   51
margin is close to 25% in the same period. Spain, too, faces an overcapacity of 
close to 20% in the period 2013–20. Only in the UK does the reserve margin fall 
back to zero around 2016. 
Because of additional investments in renewable energy technologies between 
now and 2020, the reserve margin will remain rather high in coming years. For 
onshore wind, generation capacity in Europe is expected to triple between 2008 
and 2020 while offshore wind capacity will increase more than tenfold (E.ON 
AG, 2011). The prospect of sustained overcapacity puts pressure on electricity 
prices. In fact, electricity prices below €40 per MWh are no longer exceptional 
on forward markets (European Commission 2012a). The contrast with pre-crisis 
prices is large.
The downward price evolution is enforced because of the very low marginal 
generation cost of intermittent renewable technologies. As the supply of 
generation technologies on wholesale markets is based on marginal costs, 
subsidised RES technologies push conventional generation technologies with 
the highest marginal generation costs out of the wholesale market under optimal 
weather conditions. This combination of structural overcapacity and the low 
prices on electricity wholesale markets excludes investment possibilities in 
generation technologies that do not benefit from subsidy regimes.
The low prices on electricity wholesale markets are of little relevance for 
photovoltaic (PV) and wind projects, as they benefit from subsidy schemes 
(FITs) that cover their full cost. From a societal perspective, the high cost of PV 
and offshore wind – not to be confused with their very low marginal generation 
cost (Table 3.1) – increases the cost of short-term climate policy targets. 
In other words, the current support schemes for energy from RES shelter a 
large sector from market dynamics, while the expansion of subsidised RES 
exerts a significant impact on wholesale prices and on investment opportunities 
in conventional generation. It remains unclear how long this type of market 
distortion can be sustained in a market that should be liberalised and fully 
integrated at the European level. The differences among the national RES 
support schemes already distort investment decisions in renewables. 
Table 3.1 compares the marginal generation cost – for simplicity restricted 
here to fuel costs – to the total generation cost for the main generation 
technologies. The levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) is used to calculate 
the full generation cost. The LCOE values in Table 3.1 are based on a 10% 
discount rate but exclude a carbon or a CO
2
 cost per technology. For wind and 
solar technologies, optimistic load factors from northwestern Europe have been 
selected: 25% for onshore wind, 35% for offshore wind, and 12% for PV. For 
conventional generation, the high load factors typical of the pre-crisis period 
have been selected – for example, 70% for gas-powered plants – although the 
current generation overcapacity and the expansion of RES do lead to much lower 
load factors that preclude investment.
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Table 3.1 Marginal versus total electricity generation costs for NW Europe in 
2012
Fuel cost (€/MWh)
Total cost (LCOE, exclusive of 
CO
2
 cost), €/MWh
PV (photovoltaics) 0 198
Wind onshore 0 107
Wind offshore 0 142
Nuclear 8 98
Coal 30 67
Gas 50 76
Biomass 75 122
Source: Albrecht et al. (2012).
An assessment of the LCOE is based on a stand-alone perspective for the 
technologies considered. This implies that the necessary costs of backup, 
balancing, and system flexibility are not included in the LCOE of intermittent 
generation technologies.
Table 3.1 confirms that in Europe, gas-powered electricity is not competitive 
once (wholesale) electricity prices are close to €50/MWh. As a consequence, 
coal-powered generation with a much lower marginal cost – €30/MWh in 
northwestern Europe – remains in the market and replaces gas capacity. This 
merit-order effect explains why electricity companies close down gas-powered 
plants but burn more coal. The most efficient coal-powered electricity plants can 
emit 740 g CO
2
/kWh, whereas state-of-the-art gas-powered plants emit less than 
400 g CO
2
/kWh (IEA, 2012). In northwestern Europe, many old coal-powered 
plants are still in use today, so we can assume that emissions are close to 1,000 
g CO
2
/kWh. With a high CO
2
 price in the ETS, efficient gas-powered plants 
would be much more competitive. But the electricity prices of today exclude all 
investment projects – including coal-powered generation – that do not benefit 
from production subsidies such as FIT. 
The closings of gas-powered plants in northwestern Europe are not attributable 
solely to low wholesale electricity and CO
2
 prices. In the first months of 2013, 
European gas prices were three times as high as gas prices in the US. This 
price gap is partly due to Europe’s historical preference for gas contracts with 
oil-indexed prices. Meanwhile, the US economy benefits from low gas prices 
because of the ongoing shale gas revolution. Coal-powered plants are being 
closed in the country; new electricity plants are efficient gas-powered plants. As 
a consequence, CO
2
 emissions in the US are decreasing, and the surplus of coal 
on the US market is shipped to Europe and Japan. 
Investing in new gas-powered plants is consistent with decarbonisation 
scenarios because flexible gas plants offer the capacity needed to balance 
intermittent or weather-based generation. Hence, investments in flexible new 
gas-powered plants avoid the risk of a carbon lock in. Because the attractiveness 
of gas-powered electricity depends on gas prices, Europe not only needs to 
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reconsider its climate policy goals but also the current organisation of its gas 
markets. 
The energy transition as an investment challenge
The energy transition is a global project, and all economic regions should 
contribute to it. When economic agents do not face CO
2
 mitigation incentives and 
the investment climate excludes the construction of flexible new gas-powered 
plants and intelligent energy networks, investments in crucial components of the 
transition to a low-carbon economy risk being delayed by several years. Can we 
afford the current levels of inactivity and uncertainty? What policy options can 
be considered to break the current stalemate?
A transparent assessment of the investment needs of the energy transition can 
be found in Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). We focus now on the global investment needs in the electricity 
sector to support the energy transition (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Global investment needs in the electricity sector, 2010–50  
(US$ trillion)
2010–20 2020–30 2030–50 Total
Expansion of the electricity system without 
the transition investments
5.9 6.5 15.9 28.3
Expansion of the electricity system with 
transition investments
6.5 8.7 20.7 35.9
Additional transition investments in the 
electricity sector
600 2.2 4.8 7.6
Source: Based on IEA (2012).
According to IEA (2012), close to $28 trillion will have to be invested in the 
global electricity system by 2050 to replace old assets and expand the electricity 
system in response to global economic and population expansion. Most of these 
investments will occur in emerging markets and be triggered by market forces. 
If the expansion of the electricity system also has to support the goals of the 
global energy transition, additional decarbonisation investments will be needed. 
To support the energy transition, total investment will have to amount to $36 
trillion in the period 2010–50. 
The additional investment cost of the energy transition is close to 30% of the 
projected investment needs to modernise and expand the electricity system. Of 
the total investment needs in the electricity sector of $36 trillion by 2050, $25.4 
trillion is allocated to generation technologies, while $10.5 trillion needs to be 
invested in transmission and distribution. Table 3.2 shows that the bulk of the 
transition investments should take place in the period 2030–50. In optimisation 
models such as those used for IEA (2012), a carbon value is introduced to trigger 
the deployment of available technologies and to invest in the development of 
new and much more efficient technologies. To minimise the cost of the energy 
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transition, the models assume massive investments in energy R&D in the first 
model periods, thereby lowering future deployment costs while also avoiding 
premature investments. 
The expected increase in investments in the electricity system is geographically 
concentrated in Asia. Between 2010 and 2020, close to 30% of all investments 
will take place in China. With a total investment of $1.8 trillion by 2020 – 
including energy transition investments – China will invest more than Europe 
and the US together. Energy technology companies know this. Because of its 
economic expansion, investments in Asia will be largely market-driven, which is 
definitely not the case in Europe. Total investment needs in Europe – including 
energy transition needs – are estimated by the IEA (2012) to amount to $950 
billion between 2010 and 2020. In case the transition investments in Europe 
cannot take place because of the problematic investment climate of today, the 
amount needed in the period 2020–30 will increase by a similar amount. 
As long as energy R&D projects remain financed – even in times of crisis 
marked by budget cuts – at a level sufficient to deliver efficient low-carbon 
technologies over the coming decades, the energy transition as a whole will not 
be endangered because of a decade of bad investment climate. Unfortunately, it 
remains uncertain whether energy R&D efforts are indeed high enough to prepare 
for an ambitious energy transition. The share of energy R&D expenditures in the 
total R&D budgets of OECD countries has been decreasing – from 12% in 1980 
to less than 4% today (IEA, 2012). In an earlier publication, the IEA (2010) 
compared current annual energy R&D spending levels to the estimated annual 
R&D investments needed to realise ambitious energy transition targets. That 
publication concluded that the annual estimated R&D spending gap ranged from 
$40 to $90 billion. To benchmark this R&D spending gap, consider that current 
public energy R&D spending is less than $13 billion. 
As a final note, all discussions about low-carbon electricity systems should 
include the other components of the global energy system that also need to be 
transformed – among them, manufacturing processes and the electrification of 
transportation. 
technological choices in uncertain times
Investing in energy assets is a risky business today. Investment decisions hinge on 
market expectations; poor market outlooks will delay investment programmes. 
Investors may wonder how energy markets will respond to a decade of low 
economic growth. We now know that the high economic growth rates of recent 
decades were artificially boosted and reflected unsustainable overconsumption 
based on the excessive and unsustainable debt positions of governments, private 
companies, and households (Rajan, 2010). Unfortunately, the unavoidable 
deleveraging (or reduction of outstanding excess debt) will take place at a time 
when the increasing cost of an ageing population will make it more difficult for 
governments to balance budgets. The weak economic outlook will continue to 
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have a direct impact on prices and energy demand expectations, and hence on 
investment decisions. 
The energy transition is premised on the development of new technologies that 
are then selected by investors. To minimise the cost to society of the transition, 
no single technological trajectory should be favoured; instead, the selection of 
technologies should be based on competitive mechanisms. Today’s climate and 
energy policy framework strongly influences the way technologies are selected. 
In Europe, the selection process is very complex because of the coexistence 
of technology-neutral and technology-imposing instruments. The ETS as the 
backbone of European climate policy is a technology-neutral policy instrument 
designed to ensure the selection of least-cost mitigation options by market forces. 
By contrast, the 20/20/20 package, with its RES and efficiency obligations, 
directly imposes specific technological choices. Other environmental policies, 
such as the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCP Directive 2001/80/EC) to 
limit emissions pollutants other than CO
2
 (mainly SO
2
, NO
X
, dust particles, and 
ozone precursors), also affect the use of old power plants and hence can lead to 
significant CO
2
 emission reductions. The LCP Directive can even accelerate the 
phase-out of old (coal) power plants. At the national level, nuclear phase-out 
scenarios in Germany and Belgium directly affect technological choices.  
Technology-neutral and technology-imposing measures
As many policy goals and processes can affect technological choices, Table 
3.3 distinguishes between European policy processes, goals, and instruments 
that are technology-neutral and those that can be considered as imposing 
technological choices on economic agents. The simultaneous use of technology-
neutral and technology-imposing processes, as found in Europe today, can be 
counterproductive. In Europe, a blurred combination of multiple views on how 
to select technologies is the heart of the problem. Eskeland et al. (2012) and 
Böhringer et al. (2009) provide estimates of the additional cost to society of 
some of Europe’s multiple targets and approaches. 
Table 3.3 Technology-neutral versus technology-imposing processes, goals and 
instruments in European climate and energy policy
Technology-neutral processes, goals, 
instruments
Liberalisation of energy markets, ETS,  
20% reduction target of 20/20/20
Technology-imposing processes, goals, 
instruments
20% RES target of 20/20/20, 20% efficiency 
gains target of 20/20/20, phase-out scenarios, 
LCP Directive
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Because the short-term technology-imposing instruments (such as the 20% 
RES goal) are not backed up by historical energy R&D support schemes, the 
mandatory investments in renewable generation are very expensive, while the 
opportunity of selecting less expensive mitigation options is foregone. 
From a philosophical perspective, the imposition of very specific technological 
targets is typical of the economic planning tradition, whereas the use of 
technology-neutral processes or instruments expresses belief in the power 
of market forces. However, as there is no monolithic attitude with respect to 
economic planning versus market forces within the EU, it is not surprising that 
European climate and energy policies combine both approaches. In principle, 
there is nothing wrong with this combination (IEA, 2011). What matters is that 
public R&D spending trajectories must be planned to avoid important market 
failures. Short-term penetration rates for young technologies should not be 
planned when it is more appropriate to invest first in better technologies.
Two extreme abstract views on the selection of technologies and the evolution 
of the energy system can be teased out of Table 3.3. When the free-market 
approach dominates, energy markets must be fully liberalised and a European 
carbon tax or cap-and-trade system applies to all economic sectors. From an 
investment perspective, a carbon tax is more predictable than the fluctuating CO
2
 
price in the ETS. An escalating carbon tax provides the strongest incentive to 
invest in new mitigation technologies. As market forces will select technologies 
and trigger investment decisions, national policymakers are mainly observers or 
gatekeepers. Domestic preferences for technological mixes become irrelevant as 
the European landscape will adjust to the European policy targets. 
Even in this free-market approach, policymakers have to invest in public 
R&D to ensure that more efficient energy and mitigation technologies can hit 
the markets in the next decades. Otherwise, the carbon incentives will bring 
only mature technologies into the market. Radical innovation projects such as 
the energy transition are impossible to realise without multiple policies working 
together in a synergistic package. That package includes supply-push measures 
– mainly public R&D expenditures followed by demonstration projects – and 
demand-pull measures such as the creation of niche markets, public procurement 
or fiscal incentives (Norberg-Bohm, 2002). Once technologies evolve into 
concepts ‘close to the market’ the balance will shift toward demand-pull 
measures. An effective and efficient package of policies measures should be 
based on a consistent view of how to select and diffuse technologies.
National phase-out scenarios and short-term obligations to invest in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency technologies are not consistent with this market-
oriented view on the organisation of energy markets. But because the energy 
landscape of today reflects historical choices and preferences, the pure free-
market approach alone is not a realistic option for the selection of energy 
technologies. 
The other extreme is a completely planned energy system. This option, too, 
requires the allocation of sufficient resources to energy R&D projects, in this case 
by planning departments. Under this scenario, planners define short-term and 
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long-term policy targets and regulate the optimal mix of energy and mitigation 
technologies. Economic agents lobby for adequate support mechanisms, and 
investments are made in a low-risk environment. As energy decisions are still 
made at the national level, liberalisation can only disturb the implementation of 
planning decisions. 
The ideal scheme of policy measures should be based on the dynamic 
interactions between supply-push and demand-pull measures. As it often takes 
decades to develop radically new but efficient technologies, the obsession with 
short-term targets in international climate negotiations and in the 20/20/20 
approach of the EU is problematic. For policymakers, however, the selection of 
short-term targets is tempting because many new and promising technologies are 
already available. Why not push massive deployment of the new technologies to 
realise a quick switch to low-carbon energy? 
Kramer and Haigh (2009) challenge this view on the grounds that the mere 
availability of a new technology should be distinguished from the economic 
significance (in their terms, the “materiality”) of this new technology. When 
reaching 1% of the global energy mix is taken as a benchmark, history teaches that 
it can take 30 years before a new technology achieves some market importance. 
PVs supply just 0.01% of world energy today and enjoy exponential growth rates. 
As it takes a few hundred billion dollars to bring new technologies to materiality 
and many years to build the human and industrial capacity to realise this, the 
relevance of short-term national targets on the evolution of new technologies is 
limited. Furthermore, exponential growth rates for new technologies will always 
be replaced by linear growth rates. Because energy technologies have a long 
lifetime – between 25 and 50 years – replacement rates have to be low to avoid 
large capital losses. Technological targets become especially expensive when 
technologies that are too young or too inefficient are selected too early, or when 
it becomes necessary to replace existing capital too early. 
Liberalisation or ‘small is beautiful’? 
Climate and energy policy goals through 2020 were established around 2007, 
when the liberalisation of European energy markets was in full swing. In 
principle, the liberalisation process should be complete by 2014. However, several 
member states are already experiencing a significant delay in implementing the 
liberalisation directives. Abolishing price regulation, particularly, appears to be 
very difficult in some countries. 
Liberalisation can have a strong impact on energy market decisions in the 
period during which energy and mitigation technology choices should align with 
the climate policy goals. From an investment perspective, it is challenging to 
predict the possible interactions between liberalisation as an ongoing process 
and progress with the climate policy goals. 
The liberalisation of energy markets purports to replace historical national 
energy monopolies with a larger, more efficient, transparent, and interconnected 
system in which economic agents compete and invest at the European level. 
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To ensure high levels of competition and economic efficiency, domestic market 
barriers need to be abolished. And to trigger investments and production decisions 
in the open European energy market, market forces need to be empowered. 
Ultimately, market forces will select technologies based on their market merits 
at the European scale. 
The final configuration of liberalised energy markets has never been explicitly 
specified, but capital-intensive industries are typically evolving into oligopolies 
dominated by a few transnational companies. Indeed, a likely consequence of 
the EU’s wish to foster energy companies with the capacity to pursue strategic 
goals at the European level may be that European energy markets will be 
dominated by a small number of large companies by 2030, or even earlier. The 
European Commission (2012b) has identified as a recent achievement that by 
2012 “at least 14 European electricity and/or gas companies are now active 
in more than one Member State.” We can assume that these 14 international 
companies are not small. This potentially oligopolistic market outcome may 
conflict with popular visions of decentralised generation in local energy clusters 
of small companies. In several member states, governments have taken certain 
measures to limit the power and market share of the incumbent utilities. In 
Germany, there is a gathering trend away from the mega-integrated utilities, 
back to the Stadtwerke. The German government even wants to fund 15% of 
new-plant capital expenditures of small utilities with a market share of less 
than 5% (HSBC, 2011). Schumacher’s ‘small is beautiful’ principle (1974) is 
again a very popular concept for national energy policy makers, while Europe 
is preparing the energy landscape for the rise of a limited number of powerful 
transnational corporations.
The opportunity of emerging markets for energy companies
Once energy companies operate with a European perspective, it is a small step 
to approach energy markets from a global perspective. Because the growth 
prospects for the European economy are meagre when compared with the 
emerging economies, the major European energy companies may well shift their 
focus. In the emerging markets, close to 1.8 billion people will enter the global 
consuming class over the next 15 years. Because of this expansion, McKinsey 
(2012) projects that global consumption will nearly double to $64 trillion before 
2030. Developing countries will continue to drive global growth in demand 
for manufactured goods as well in demand for energy system investments. 
The needed expansion of the Chinese electricity system alone over the next 
decade offers a market opportunity of $1.8 trillion (IEA, 2012). Why invest in a 
stationary European market with uncertain returns when emerging markets offer 
a guaranteed profit?
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What’s next?
The current climate and energy policy framework is not optimal. Several options 
can be considered to improve its overall effectiveness. We can distinguish between 
short-term and long-term options. Their relevance depends on a more consistent 
view of how to change the energy system. In the short run, it is unlikely that 
Europe’s policy framework will change radically – for example, by phasing out 
the ETS after 2020 or suddenly eliminating the 20% RES or the 20% efficiency 
target from the 20/20/20 package. Radical changes in policy development are 
possible only in the long run.
Between now and 2020
The European Commission has launched a debate over so-called backloading 
options to increase the ETS price in the next years. Backloading refers to 
temporarily removing from the market a huge volume of permits – for example, 
a billion ETS permits in the period between 2013 and 2015 – and re-injecting 
them into the market later on. With backloading, there is no destruction or 
buyback of permits. As such, it can alter the average CO
2
 price in a given year 
but will not lead to a structural change in the CO
2 
price. Hence, backloading will 
hardly affect decisions on mitigation investments by ETS companies in ETS 
Phase III. Moreover, ETS companies object to backloading strategies because 
they further complicate investment decisions without offering a real solution. 
The ETS price could easily be regulated by installing a price floor that would 
vary over time. It could be limited to auctioned permits or set for all transactions 
in the ETS. Given the low CO
2
 prices of today, the floor would set the market 
price. The ETS would then be transformed into a carbon taxation scheme. This 
is not a desirable transformation of the cornerstone of European climate policy 
and the ETS was thus the wrong choice. Although public authorities count on 
ETS revenues to finance energy R&D projects and a price floor could secure 
sufficient resources to finance the needed research efforts, ETS companies 
would object to a shifting floor as an unpredictable and discriminatory market 
intervention. (Discriminatory because the floor would be especially beneficial 
for companies with excess permits that they could now sell at higher prices.) It 
would be difficult to introduce a price floor without discriminatory consequences. 
Because the low CO
2
 price in the ETS reflects some structural economic trends – 
partly embedded in the design of European policies – why tamper with a market 
mechanism intended to reveal information? If a price floor were to be installed, 
a European floor should be preferred over different floors in different member 
states. 
A much more attractive option relates to the cap for ETS Phase IV. Around 
2015, Europe should present a clear post-2020 climate policy perspective to 
all ETS and non-ETS economic agents. The cap for ETS Phase IV should be 
consistent with the overall CO
2
 reduction target by 2030 or by 2035. When the 
energy transition is taken as the reference perspective, it would make sense to set 
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a long-term reduction target with ETS caps up to 2035, or even later. In that case, 
the next ETS phase would run from 2021 until 2035. But if saving the ETS as the 
cornerstone of climate policy is the main priority, a 2028 or 2030 cap for the next 
phase will have more impact on the ETS market in the period 2015–20. Because 
of banking (i.e., transferring non-used permits from one Phase to another) 
between Phase III and Phase IV, a very challenging ETS cap by 2028 or 2030 
would increase demand for permits before 2020 and push prices up. To avoid 
the risk that complementary targets (articulated in a possible 30/30/30 follow-
up to the 20/20/20 package) would again reduce the demand for ETS permits 
and hence the relevance of the ETS as a cost-minimising policy instrument, it is 
essential that no RES target and no energy efficiency target should be set after 
2020. Europe should support the future deployment of energy from renewable 
sources and efficiency technologies by allocating a significant share of ETS 
revenues to R&D projects dedicated to future generations of renewable and 
efficiency technologies. In the absence of binding targets for RES after 2020, 
member states would be able to phase out subsidy regimes, thus lowering the 
cost of the energy transition. The removal of an important sheltered sector with 
an impact on the investment climate for conventional generation technologies 
would facilitate the completion of the internal market. 
Some ETS companies argue that the low CO
2
 price in the ETS should not be 
seen as a problem because European industry still faces a recession. A higher 
CO
2
 price would increase the operational costs of energy-intensive companies 
that are already struggling with the crisis. Some ETS companies state that those 
not pleased by the current functioning of the ETS are free to buy CO
2
 permits 
to increase the price; given the estimated overallocation of 1.4 billion permits, 
buying permits to eliminate the overallocation would cost close to $7 billion. 
This clearly is not a realistic option. But if some governments decide to buy 300 
million CO
2
 permits in 2014 as an exceptional intervention to restore market 
fundamentals and announce their intention to buy additional volumes in Phase 
III when deemed appropriate, market expectations could adjust to a lower level 
of overallocation, leading to higher prices. Although ETS companies with excess 
permits would support this type of intervention, European institutions and 
national authorities should not participate directly in the market because they 
designed the ETS and will later decide on its future caps. Regulators, too, should 
stick to their role and not act like the market participants they regulate. Another 
aspect relates to insider trading. When public authorities today buy permits at a 
low price and later introduce a very ambitious cap for 2030, they can sell their 
permits at much higher prices. Such an abuse of market power to create profits 
would not be acceptable to private market parties.
Long-term options
The ETS can be saved. At the same time, phasing out technology-imposing 
measures would increase the consistency of European climate and energy policy. 
A phase-out of RES targets would also be consistent with the goal of integrating 
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energy markets. The continuation of the ETS in its next phases – possibly 
through 2050 – does not eliminate the risk that external factors, such as a new 
recession between 2020 and 2025, might again depress CO
2
 permit prices, bring 
on a temporary excess in generation capacity, and cloud the investment climate. 
The situation today does not immediately threaten the prospects for the 
energy transition by 2050, because most transition investments will have to take 
place after 2030 to avoid expensive lock-ins of young technologies. But that 
could change if we face several recessions between now and 2050. Since 1975, 
financial crises that have a sizable impact on the real economy have become more 
frequent (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). With today’s excessive debt positions, 
the frequency of future financial crises accompanying economic downturns 
may even increase. The prospect of several such periods in which investment 
incentives dry up because of economic slowdowns may fundamentally endanger 
the energy transition. 
We saw from Table 3.2 that the transition of the electricity system will require 
a total investment of $4.8 trillion between 2030 and 2050. That is a small part 
of the total energy transition investment needs of $36 trillion between now and 
2050, which come on top of a total investment of $120 trillion to modernise and 
expand the global energy system irrespective of transition targets (IEA, 2012). 
Financing $120 trillion will be an enormous challenge. A severe economic crisis 
between 2030 and 2035 could easily slow investment in expansion and transition. 
After such a recession, investment would resume, but is unlikely that all of the 
investments needed for the period 2030–40 could be executed in the second half 
of that period. Without very strong economic incentives – comparable to the 
attractiveness of investing in growing markets – energy transition investment 
would likely be crowded out by investment in deferred conventional expansion. 
As capital markets and technology companies face limitations in their ability 
to manage and execute projects, it is quite likely that a severe economic crisis 
between 2030 and 2035 would lead to a very low level of transition investments 
between 2030 and 2040. As long as future economic downturns do not endanger 
energy R&D spending levels, the constant technological improvements can 
provide a permanent incentive to re-launch transition efforts after the next crisis. 
But if a crisis leads to cuts in public and private spending on energy R&D, the 
energy transition may become a utopian project. For a long-term investment 
project such as the energy transition, stable and strong economic incentives, as 
well as a guaranteed investment in energy R&D, are essential. 
Whatever policy design is selected, a severe economic crisis will always 
affect investment behaviour and can delay the pace of the energy transition. 
Some policy instruments will respond more strongly to economic downturns 
than others. Because of its design, the ETS, for example, with its rigid caps 
will always respond strongly to economic downturns. A carbon tax offers a 
stable price incentive to invest in mitigation technologies. With carbon taxation, 
fiscal revenues are rather easy to predict as long as the economy avoids cyclical 
extremes. Although a severe recession would certainly cut carbon taxation 
revenue, once the economy recovered that revenue would bounce back. (The 
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ETS price, by contrast, could remain at too low a level for much too long.) 
However, carbon taxes will not be popular during recessions, and rigid taxes 
could even deepen or extend the recession. This could be avoided by relating 
the carbon tax rate to GDP growth rates. During recessions and early recoveries, 
carbon tax rates could be cut by some specified amount. During good economic 
times, revenue from carbon taxes should be reserved to finance future energy 
R&D expenditures, thereby reducing the risk of R&D investment being cut 
during downturns. 
The crowding out of energy transition investments by energy expansion 
investments may be the main long-term challenge for the energy transition. To 
protect transition investments, the economic attractiveness of energy transition 
technologies should be enhanced through a decisive increase in energy R&D 
efforts. 
conclusion
The energy transition is a gigantic global investment project. However, because 
of the current economic crisis and the design of European climate and energy 
policies, Europe today faces a very unfavourable investment climate for low-
carbon initiatives. The EU ETS suffers from a severe overallocation of emission 
permits, which has depressed the CO
2
 price. ETS companies have no market 
incentive to invest in mitigation technologies. Because of overcapacity in 
conventional generation, wholesale electricity prices are falling and are already 
too low to trigger investments in new generation and network assets. The resulting 
dispropensity to invest could significantly delay the pace of decarbonisation 
efforts in Europe. 
Europe’s current policy design combines technology-neutral instruments, such 
as the ETS, with technology-imposing targets, such as the 20% RES target for 
2020. Conflicts between policy goals, meanwhile, reduce the effectiveness of the 
ETS. To make matters worse, European policy goals have a short time horizon 
and are not responsive to external factors such as an economic recession. The 
most likely solution (i.e., the most feasible from a pragmatic policy perspective) 
for the current inefficiencies is the introduction of an ambitious Phase IV cap 
for the ETS by 2028 or 2030. Because of banking between Phase III and Phase 
IV, the future cap would influence market behaviour and the CO
2
 price between 
2015 and 2020. After 2020, no further mandatory targets for energy from RES or 
for efficiency investments should be set. Targets for subsidised RES have created 
a large, sheltered sector that is not consistent with energy market integration and 
liberalisation. 
Today’s poor investment climate need not endanger the energy transition as 
a long-term project because the bulk of the needed transition investments will 
take place after 2030. Unfortunately, the world is sure to experience global 
recessions between now and 2050, and today’s excessive debt will aggravate 
economic vulnerability in the next decades. To avoid a crowding out of 
investment in the energy transition by deferred investments in energy system 
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expansion at the end of each recession, policy frameworks will have to ensure 
the continuous funding of energy R&D at very high levels. The more attractive 
energy transition technologies become, the lower the risk that investments in 
those technologies will be crowded out. Allocating carbon taxation revenues to 
energy R&D budgets offers the advantage of a relatively predictable flow of 
revenue. Future recessions will always have the effect of depressing the CO
2
 
price in the ETS, thereby putting mitigation investments on hold and lowering 
the revenue derived from CO
2
 auctions. A carbon tax, by contrast, offers a 
permanent economic incentive. Because the energy transition will be delayed 
by stop-and-go investment dynamics, policy designs should try to maximise 
predictability and stability. A radical reform of the European policy framework 
is therefore essential. Reconsidering the 1992 proposal for a European carbon 
tax could offer inspiration.
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